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ABSTRACT
This article presents a new and innovative framework to help
analyse policy-making and depoliticisation within subnational
governance arrangements. By focusing on the capacity (not the
autonomy) of subnational governments to achieve their political
objectives, and incorporating external actors along both the
vertical and horizontal dimensions, it provides a dynamic tool to
understand the extent to which municipal governments inﬂuence
local policy-making processes. Furthermore, it stresses that greater
‘localism’ (or independence) between vertical tiers of government
is likely to weaken subnational bodies and result in them
becoming more interdependent with (or even dependent on)
horizontal non-state actors within the locality. This would weaken
their position in local governance arrangements and exacerbate
the depoliticised nature of decision-making.
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Introduction
In recent decades, particularly as policy-makers have sought to address an increasing
number of ‘wicked issues’ (Rittel and Webber 1973), scholars have begun to appreciate
the crucial role of subnational bodies in the delivery of public goods and services
(Ostrom 1990; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nonetti 1993; Savitch and Kantor 2002). Such
issues (which include climate change, obesity, overﬁshing, migration and teenage preg-
nancy) cannot be solved solely by national governments: indeed, in order to deal with
them effectively, a whole range of state and non-state actors need to be involved in ‘gov-
ernance’ arrangements. In response, public bodies in many Western countries have devel-
oped policy together with non-state actors, in order to try and respond to complex
problems more effectively (Rhodes 1997; Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Geddes 2005;
Weber and Khademian 2008; Mayntz 2010). At the same time, politicians have allocated
an increasing number of functions to ‘arms-length’ institutions, which has ‘depoliticised’
decision-making (Flinders and Wood 2014), and led some to argue that we are moving
towards a ‘post-democratic’ era (Crouch 2004). This is in spite of the fact that countries
such as the UK and Australia have espoused principles of ‘localism’ and the devolution
of responsibilities to subnational levels, in an attempt to strengthen democratic
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engagement and/or deal with such complex problems more effectively (Evans, Marsh, and
Stoker 2013).
Since governance – by deﬁnition – means that various different actors are involved in
decision-making processes, this new situation means it is much more difﬁcult to identify
who is inﬂuencing policy. This becomes even more complex when issues cut across juris-
dictional and administrative tiers of government – an increasingly common occurrence in
the era of wicked issues. Although ideas of ‘multi-level governance’ (Marks 1993; Hooghe
and Marks 2003) have proved popular in the past, they do not provide the analytical tools
to understand which actors are shaping decision-making processes and therefore the
reasons why a particular jurisdiction takes a speciﬁc policy approach (Rosamond 2000;
Smith 2003; Zito 2015).
This article builds on Rhodes’ (1981) notion of power dependency in central–local
relations and Stone’s (1989) concept of ‘urban regimes’ to present an innovative and
dynamic theoretical framework that helps to understand policy-making at the subnational
level. Notably, the model takes account of other governance actors along both the ‘vertical’
and ‘horizontal’ dimensions (higher tiers of government and other local organisations
respectively), and allows scholars to pinpoint whether subnational bodies are independent
of, interdependent with or dependent on these other stakeholders. This enables us to ident-
ify the most powerful actors within subnational jurisdictions, and therefore which stake-
holders are inﬂuencing decision-making and policy outputs.
The next section gives a brief overview of the methodology adopted to develop the
theoretical framework, and this is followed by a discussion of the existing literature on
multi-level and urban governance. The article then sets out the new theoretical framework,
before concluding with suggestions as to how scholars might wish to apply the approach in
empirical study.
Methodology
This article developed from a critical reading of various literatures on subnational govern-
ance, which revealed gaps in the theoretical understanding of local policy-making arrange-
ments. These gaps became apparent when existing theories could not adequately explain
the empirical ﬁndings from comparative ﬁeldwork in one English and one German muni-
cipality between 2012 and 2014. As such, the framework is the product of both inductive
and deductive reasoning, since it draws not only on existing theoretical approaches but
also on speciﬁc observations in the ﬁeld.
Existing perspectives on multi-level and urban governance
Governance, deﬁned as ‘the involvement of society in the process of governing’ (Hill and
Hupe 2002, 14), suggests that public ofﬁcials work more collaboratively with external
actors in formulating and implementing policy. In recent decades it has become an
inﬂuential leitmotif in studies of subnational policy-making in various sectors (Miller,
Dickson, and Stoker 2000; John 2001; Heinelt 2002; Stoker 2003; Bulkeley and Betsill
2005; Pierre and Peters 2012). This is particularly the case where decision-makers have
sought to involve a range of different actors in their strategies to address ‘wicked’ policy
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issues – problems that may defy resolution due to the conﬂicting interests of those stake-
holders who are affected by them.
These studies have often referred to the idea ofmulti-level governance – the notion that
governance ‘happens’ both within and between local, regional, national and international
tiers. This term was ﬁrst coined by Marks (1993) to describe the workings of the European
Union (EU) and its member states, before gaining wider currency. Indeed, the emergence
of supranational institutions such as the EU, initiatives to decentralise functions within
many nation-states and the implementation of structural reforms associated with New
Public Management have made the term increasingly relevant to Western democracies
(Peters and Pierre 2001). It recognises that policy priorities are shaped and delivered
both ‘downwards’ (e.g. from central to local government) and ‘upwards’ (in the opposite
direction) along the vertical dimension, whilst also acknowledging that governance is an
important horizontal factor across each of these tiers.
Indeed, a multi-level perspective can help to set the scene for a more holistic analysis of
policy processes and implementation strategies in a variety of scenarios. For example,
higher tiers of government might impose speciﬁc targets on subnational tiers, or attach
strings to funding grants to try and ensure that policy objectives are achieved. Alterna-
tively, they may provide additional resources to help local authorities achieve their objec-
tives fairly autonomously of other horizontal actors. For their part, private actors may also
exercise signiﬁcant inﬂuence over decision-making – due to the subnational body being
inherently weak, and/or because public ofﬁcials feel that involving other stakeholders
could help to achieve strategic or political objectives.
Together with Lisbet Hooghe, Marks developed the initial idea further by characterising
two different types of multi-level governance: Type I, which consists of relatively static,
multi-purpose jurisdictions where a single public body has direct responsibility for a
range of services; and Type II, where ad hoc, task-speciﬁc organisations are more
common (Hooghe and Marks 2003). They acknowledged that the two types normally
overlap in the real world, and that most (if not all) countries are positioned somewhere
along a spectrum between the two ideal models. Nonetheless, they can be useful shorthand
to highlight contrasting governance arrangements in different countries, or to illustrate
changes in institutional structures within a single jurisdiction. Indeed, various studies
have identiﬁed a shift towards governance structures that resemble Type II arrangements
– often due to the increasing fragmentation and ﬂexibility of political institutions, and the
creation of more functional agencies to undertake particular tasks (Alexander 1991;
Herrschel and Newman 2002; Miller, Dickson, and Stoker 2000; Goldsmith 2012). This
article will use Hooghe and Marks’ typology to illustrate some of the key concepts
within the new theoretical framework it presents.
Importantly, however, the multi-level perspective does not overcome a crucial problem
inherent in the governance literature: ultimately, it can only describe governance arrange-
ments, rather than help to understand the reasons for any differences between jurisdic-
tions – or indeed their implications for policy-making (Smith 2003). Indeed, as Zito
(2015) points out, there has never been widespread agreement on what multi-level govern-
ance is trying to explain, with the result that scholars have tended to use the term as a
metaphor rather than a theoretical tool (see also Rosamond 2000). In particular, since
the typology does not assist with analysing relationships between governing actors, it
cannot identify which stakeholders are most inﬂuential in policy-making arrangements.
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Perhaps reﬂecting its genesis in political science, multi-level governance also tends to focus
primarily on vertical relationships between tiers – and therefore it neglects to take sufﬁ-
cient account of the inﬂuence of other horizontal actors within subnational jurisdictions.
The framework set out in this article incorporates both of these dimensions and thereby
supports a much more comprehensive and dynamic understanding of local governance.
A number of related theoretical perspectives suffer from similar shortcomings. For
example, ‘meta-governance’ perspectives (Jessop 2002; Kooiman 2003) also do not
include useful tools for analysing power dynamics, which means they cannot help us to
identify which actors are inﬂuencing policy-making processes. Similarly, although some
scholars of policy networks stress the importance of analysing degrees of integration
between actors (see e.g. Atkinson and Coleman 1992; Jordan and Schubert 1992; Marsh
and Rhodes 1992), they focus primarily on the extent of collaboration rather than how
this may inﬂuence policy-making. As Börzel (1998) argues, policy analysis needs to go
beyond identifying which actors are involved in networks: instead, it has to try and under-
stand the power relationships and structures that operate within them (see also Scharpf
1991; Dowding 1995).
Rhodes (1997) does acknowledge the important role of power in shaping decision-
making, but he retains the idea of a ‘policy network’ and therefore suggests that all affected
stakeholders remain in frequent contact with each other and develop solutions collabora-
tively. In fact, it is unlikely that the plethora of actors affected by a complex wicked issue
could form a cohesive ‘network’ in the true sense of the word, given that they would have
potentially competing objectives and cross over multiple policy sectors (Schout and Jordan
2005). Furthermore, the network metaphor does not take sufﬁcient account of the differ-
ence between vertical power dependencies (in other words, those that exist between tiers of
government) and horizontal relationships (the way in which subnational bodies interact
with other actors within their jurisdictions). As this article will demonstrate, the former
can play a crucial role in determining the latter.
Although the urban governance literature also tends to provide useful typologies and
categorisations, such geographical perspectives tend to focus on horizontal relationships
between different actors at the local or regional level. For example, in their exposition
of different ‘modes of governing’, Bulkeley and Kern (2006) propose different approaches
that municipalities might adopt to achieve political objectives. Drawing on ﬁeldwork in
several cities, they suggest that subnational governments are shifting increasingly
towards an ‘enabling’ mode – in that they try to facilitate and encourage other local sta-
keholders to help with policy implementation, rather than introduce and enforce hierarch-
ical regulations. However, the perspective does not provide the theoretical support to
understand the nature of these horizontal relationships, and therefore which actors are
ultimately shaping policy. Moreover, it fails to take sufﬁcient account of other vertical
actors. This means we do not have a holistic contextual understanding – and we also
lack the theoretical tools to explain differences in subnational governing arrangements
between countries.
Although a number of edited books have highlighted the contrasting legal and insti-
tutional contexts within which subnational governments in developed countries
operate, they have focused on creating typologies of contrasting local government
systems, rather than exploring the reasons for these differences (Goldsmith and Page
1987; Hesse and Sharpe 1991; Bennett 1993; Norton 1994; Pierre 1999; John 2001;
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Hulst and van Montfort 2007). This literature categorises systems of subnational govern-
ment by its legal or constitutional status, scope of responsibility, the size of individual units
and degree of ﬁscal autonomy from the centre. Some comparative studies have taken a
similar approach in order to identify how different systems inﬂuence decentralisation
or centralisation initiatives (see e.g. Dickovick 2011). Crucially, however, these typologies
have lacked a robust assessment of how subnational institutions seek to achieve their pol-
itical objectives. Indeed, this omission may explain the fact that scholars have developed
various typologies of subnational government, and sometimes group certain countries
together that might otherwise have little in common.
The importance of capacity for local choice
Perhaps one reason for the plethora of typologies is the potential for confusion between
the notion of subnational autonomy (the de jure right to take political decisions
without interference from central government) and capacity (the de facto ability to
achieve political objectives). This distinction is crucial for understanding the nature of
subnational policy-making. For example, local authorities that ‘surrender’ some of their
freedom by working closely with external actors may ﬁnd that they are better placed to
deliver policy goals than municipalities that remain more autonomous. Such an argument
is of course not new to international relations scholars, some of whom have been using
similar concepts for several decades when discussing the nature of state capacity and
power in the global arena (Keohane and Nye 1977; Baldwin 1980). Nonetheless, the
concept is particularly relevant in wicked sectors and/or at the subnational level, given
that municipal governments are unlikely to be able to address complex policy issues inde-
pendently of other actors.
More generally, the urban governance literature has shown how the desire of munici-
palities to seek out resources from other actors to increase their capacity is accelerating the
shift away from state hierarchy and traditional ‘government’ and towards more horizontal
and inclusive subnational arrangements (Stoker 1999; John 2001; Schwalb andWalk 2007;
Waterman 2014). Indeed, the extent to which public bodies need to rely on external
support to achieve their goals will probably shape the nature of governance relationships
(see Sellers and Lidström 2007).
Crucially, however, scholars have not incorporated the concept of capacity into theories
that could help to explain differences in governance approaches across (and potentially
within) countries. Given that the capacity of subnational bodies varies from country to
country, this is somewhat surprising. For example, various studies have found that
‘urban regimes’ (semi-permanent governance arrangements in which the municipality
works extremely closely with societal actors (Stone 1989)) are much more common in
the US than elsewhere in the developed world (Stoker and Mossberger 1994; John 2001;
Herrschel and Newman 2002). A key reason for this is that local authorities in the US
do not have the same level of internal capacity as those in most Western European
countries. Elected representatives in weak subnational bodies of this nature are ‘policy-
seeking’ rather than ‘ofﬁce-seeking’ (Müller and Strøm 1999), and they look to private
businesses to provide them with the ‘power to’ achieve their objectives. This makes
them much more likely to engage and compromise with other horizontal actors than
their counterparts in many European countries.
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Capacity and power dependence
Therefore, the vertical context within which subnational bodies operate is likely to shape
their capacity to achieve policy objectives and inﬂuence the extent to which they collab-
orate with external actors. With this in mind, intergovernmental relations perspectives
that highlight resource interdependencies between tiers are particularly helpful. These the-
ories have their roots in organisational sociology and the idea that a high level of interde-
pendency between companies makes them more likely to survive economic downturns
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Aldrich 1979). Scholars such as Benson (1982) adapted this
notion for the public sector, and stressed the interdependent nature of subnational and
central governments. For example, although the centre normally allocates some funding
to the periphery, subnational governments usually provide relevant information and
implement central policy in return. Indeed, various studies in the 1970s found that
local and state governments in Germany had access to crucial sources of local information
and technical expertise (Baestlein et al. 1978; Garlichs and Hull 1978; Mayntz 1978) that
eluded the federal government. Notably, this enabled them to exercise signiﬁcant inﬂuence
over federal policy programmes.
Of course, the extent to which subnational actors can shape decision-making is likely to
vary from country to country. It might depend on how resources are distributed within
these relationships (subnational actors that can raise additional revenues easily are in a
stronger position than those who have no access to extra funding), or the degree of
local discretion over policy directives. Nonetheless, by focusing on such variables within
interdependent relationships we can begin to identify which actors are exerting most inﬂu-
ence over decision-making.
Indeed, Rhodes (1981) adopted the idea of power dependence very effectively in the
context of central–local relations in the UK. Central to his analysis was identifying the
nature of the interdependent relationship, namely which resources each tier of govern-
ment requires and who can provide them. These resources are not solely ﬁnancial: they
may also be constitutional or political, shaped by the hierarchical nature of intergovern-
mental relations, or associated with particular expertise or access to information.
Rhodes recognised that power dependencies are rarely symmetrical, but he stressed that
different tiers of government are always interdependent to some extent.
His perspective provides a useful starting point for identifying which factors may be
shaping governance arrangements within any given jurisdiction. This is because any
change in the availability of resources or in the importance that a stakeholder attaches
to any particular resource will affect power relationships. Therefore, his framework is
also dynamic and responsive to changes in intergovernmental relations that may be due
to ‘soft’ political, economic or personnel developments – not just ‘hard’ legal or consti-
tutional reforms.
Rhodes developed his framework by studying a unitary country (the UK), but it is
nonetheless applicable in federal contexts – or in countries where vertical governmental
bureaucracies may be underdeveloped. Municipalities probably have different resource
interdependencies with provincial governments compared to federal institutions, and
these relationships are likely to vary across countries – see for example Fenwick’s
(2016) comparison of Argentina and Brazil. Similarly, in contexts where state institutions
are weak and/or public ofﬁcials resort to unofﬁcial systems of clientelism or local
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patronage in order to achieve their objectives, the basic principle of resource interdepen-
dence remains valid (Kühn 2008; Hutchcroft 2014). If we wish to analyse the extent to
which municipalities can exercise local choice, the identity of external actors in such situ-
ations is far less important than whether subnational governments want to access the
resources they possess. By estimating the sum total of resources that municipalities
require from all other actors, as well as those that they provide in return, we can see
how these interdependencies shape governance relationships.
Moreover, although Rhodes focused on central–local relations, his theory is equally
applicable to horizontal relationships between government bodies and other actors operat-
ing within the same jurisdiction (such as quangos, voluntary organisations, private com-
panies or clients). As with the vertical analysis, by amalgamating the support a
municipality requires from all other horizontal actors, and comparing this with the
resources it provides in return, we can identify the nature of power dependence within
the area. At this point we can see the relevance of Stone’s (1989) analysis of ‘urban
regimes’, and the notion that municipalities work with other local actors to increase
their ‘power to’ achieve political objectives.
Overall, therefore, the principle of resource interdependence shapes how municipalities
interact with other stakeholders along both vertical and horizontal dimensions – and it can
inﬂuence policy outputs accordingly. Bringing together political science and urban studies
perspectives together in this way allows for a much more holistic analysis of subnational
policy-making than existing theoretical approaches – and one that is not ‘ﬁxed’ according
to the de jure status of municipalities within the constitutional framework.
Although he does not address this explicitly, Rhodes implies that greater dependency is
the converse of high levels of interdependency. In other words, if A is more dependent on
the resources it receives from B and C than they are on the support that A provides in
return, an asymmetrical relationship develops in which B and/or C can exert greater inﬂu-
ence over A’s decision-making. However, if each organisation pursues its own objectives
largely autonomously (in other words, if there is very limited reciprocity between the three
actors because they already have sufﬁcient capacity to achieve policy goals – or, alterna-
tively, they refuse to provide additional resources to each other), they would actually be
more independent of each other. In this scenario, no interdependent (or even dependent)
relationship would develop. Such eventualities cannot be illustrated easily using Rhodes’
framework, but they are nonetheless perfectly possible.
Figures 1 and 2 show how any given subnational jurisdiction might be positioned
according to these three poles of power dependency. They also highlight how we can
apply the notion along both dimensions: in other words, map the extent to which the
organisation is independent of, interdependent with or dependent on higher tiers of gov-
ernment and other local actors. The ﬁgures return to the characterisations of Hooghe and
Marks (2003) by mapping all three potential scenarios (interdependence, dependence and
independence) against the ‘ideal’ Type I and Type II multi-level governance arrangements
on both the vertical and horizontal dimensions. The diagrams take the subnational body’s
perspective; in other words, where an organisation is located close to the dependence pole,
this is because it relies more heavily on other actors than they do on it. By illustrating the
type of relationships that exist both vertically and horizontally, they serve as a starting
point for identifying the extent to which subnational governments have the power to
achieve their political objectives.
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Figure 1 illustrates the vertical dependency arrangements, and shows how subnational
and central governments that operate in an ideal Type I jurisdiction are highly interdepen-
dent. This is because the structured institutional architecture encourages all levels to get
involved in making and implementing policy – even if the legal framework may allocate
speciﬁc competencies to particular tiers. Indeed, their interdependence may even reinforce
the existing institutional structures, particularly if all actors along this vertical dimension
believe that collaboration and pooling resources increases their capacity to achieve policy
objectives. By way of contrast, since vertical Type II arrangements are ﬂexible and
Figure 1. Vertical power dependency relationships in Types I and II multi-level governance
arrangements.
Figure 2. Horizontal power dependency relationships in Types I and II multi-level governance
arrangements.
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dynamic, subnational bodies in these jurisdictions may operate more independently of
higher tiers of government – or they could be asymmetrically dependent on resources
from the centre. In other words, Figure 1 highlights some of the shortcomings of
Hooghe and Marks’ typology, whilst nonetheless illustrating how their ideal models sit
some distance away from each other along the vertical dimension.
In a similar way, Figure 2 shows where ideal Type I and Type II municipalities would be
located along the horizontal dimension. Since Type I arrangements suggest that responsi-
bilities are concentrated into ‘multi-purpose’ jurisdictions, these bodies have responsibility
for a wide range of functions and do not have to rely on other agencies to achieve their
objectives. As such, they can operate largely autonomously of other horizontal actors
and are positioned close to the independence pole. In contrast, subnational governments
in Type II jurisdictions rely heavily on ‘task-speciﬁc’ bodies (such as special-purpose
vehicles, external contractors and ‘depoliticised’ arms-length agencies) to achieve their
objectives. This relationship may be interdependent, because the subnational body
might provide democratic legitimacy, funding or other resources in return. Alternatively,
it could be more dependent, if non-state actors do not need to rely very heavily on the
public institution for resources – because, for example, they can ﬁnd them elsewhere or
manage without them. As such, Type II jurisdictions are positioned towards one of
these two poles along the horizontal dimension.
Theoretical and practical implications of the framework
These diagrams illustrate how Hooghe and Marks’ typologies of multi-level governance
interlock with and can be augmented by Rhodes’ theory of power dependence. More
importantly, however, they can also help to examine power relationships within govern-
ance arrangements by highlighting the nature of resource dependencies between actors,
along both the vertical and horizontal dimensions. This makes them useful tools for ana-
lysing policy-making approaches in multi-level and potentially dynamic contexts. In par-
ticular, by examining the nature of those resources that a jurisdiction exchanges in order to
increase its capacity to achieve policy objectives, we can begin to understand which actors
are likely to be more inﬂuential in decision-making processes.
Furthermore, we can propose that vertical power dependencies play a crucial role in
inﬂuencing horizontal relationships and policy-making processes, particularly in sectors
that require complex responses or speciﬁc expertise. For example, if a subnational organ-
isation does not receive support from central government to help with policy formulation
and implementation, it may lack the internal capacity to achieve its objectives autono-
mously. As a result, it will need to work more interdependently with (or it may even
depend on) other horizontal actors in order to deliver its policy goals. Furthermore, its
relatively weak position vis à vis other local stakeholders will probably result in a consen-
sual policy style that is more open to compromise, since it will need to rely on external
support. This consensual approach could mean that other horizontal actors are able to
exercise signiﬁcant inﬂuence in policy-making processes.
By way of contrast, if different tiers of government seek to increase their capacity by
pooling resources and becoming more interdependent along the vertical dimension, this
is much more likely to help subnational governments operate independently of other hori-
zontal stakeholders (that is, if they choose to do so). Such a scenario would also enable the
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public body to act more hierarchically within its jurisdiction, since it would not require
many external resources to achieve its policy objectives and therefore would not need
to compromise with other local actors.
To complete the picture, we might also expect a subnational body that is highly depen-
dent on vertical actors to operate more independently and hierarchically along the hori-
zontal dimension. This is because it will not lack the capacity to achieve its policy
objectives, and therefore does not need to rely heavily on other local stakeholders. Cru-
cially, however, central government would be in a strong position to exert signiﬁcant inﬂu-
ence over subnational policy-making, since it would be providing most of the resources to
help with implementation and therefore might link funding streams to the delivery of
ministerial objectives, for example.
Figure 3 sets out this characterisation as a hypothesis for further empirical investi-
gation. This could involve comparative study, in order to investigate whether more inter-
dependent vertical relationships do indeed result in subnational governments exercising
greater inﬂuence over policy-making within their jurisdictions. For example, we might
expect subnational governments in countries such as Germany, with its culture of inter-
dependent cooperative federalism (or Politikverﬂechtung, see Scharpf, Reissert, and Schna-
bel 1976), to be able to take decisions largely independently of other local stakeholders. By
way of contrast, subnational bodies that operate more independently of the centre in a
‘dual polity’ such as the UK (Bulpitt 1983; Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg 2000) may need
to rely much more on other horizontal actors in policy-making processes. The boxes on
the far right-hand side of the diagram also have a number of normative implications,
since they suggest that more dependent and independent vertical relationships reduce
the ability of subnational governments to exercise local choice. This raises questions of
‘depoliticisation’ and democratic accountability – issues that are already at the centre of
many critiques of New Public Management (Eckersley, Ferry, and Zakaria 2014) and
governance (Palumbo 2015), as well as the shift towards political institutions seeking
legitimacy based on their ‘outputs’ rather than just their ‘inputs’ (Scharpf 1999).
Figure 3 also highlights the role of vertical relationships in shaping subnational
decision-making. This is because subnational governments can only exert very limited
inﬂuence over the vertical context within which they operate, whereas they tend to have
signiﬁcantly more freedom to determine their horizontal relationships. Crucially, if
Figure 3. How vertical power dependencies might shape horizontal policy-making and local choice: A
hypothesis for investigation.
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municipalities are unable to access the resources they require from other vertical actors,
they will need to seek out this support horizontally – a situation that is likely to weaken
their inﬂuence over policy-making and therefore increase the pace of depoliticisation.
In other words, central governments exercise signiﬁcant inﬂuence over subnational
policy-making arrangements, because ministers need to initiate (or at least agree to)
changes in vertical power dependencies.
As this article has demonstrated, however, it is important to note that ministers do not
inﬂuence subnational governance solely by restricting or increasing the degree of local
autonomy. A more important (and neglected) factor is the extent to which they work
interdependently with subnational governments in order to give them enough capacity
to achieve local political objectives. Vertical collaboration of this nature is perhaps even
more crucial in those countries that have weakened state institutions signiﬁcantly in
recent decades – or where public bureaucracies are underdeveloped – because these con-
ditions enable market actors to exert greater inﬂuence within horizontal governance
arrangements.
By extension, any proposal to devolve more powers to subnational governments is unli-
kely to make much difference to local decision-making unless these bodies are (also) pro-
vided with sufﬁcient support and capacity to achieve their political objectives. In other
words, the rhetoric of ‘localism’ has failed to take account of organisational capacity
and the crucial role that vertical interdependence plays in allowing subnational organis-
ations to make and implement policy independently within their jurisdictions. Instead,
localism has focused on increasing the degree of independence between tiers of govern-
ment – a scenario that may well reduce the capacity of subnational bodies and mean
that they become more dependent on other horizontal actors in policy-making processes.
Indeed, as Evans, Marsh, and Stoker (2013, 403) point out in the UK context, it has
resulted in a situation ‘in which responsibilities, rather than power or resources, [are]
devolved’. Paradoxically, it may actually reduce the ability of subnational governments
to exercise local choice and shape decision-making within their jurisdictions, because
they will need to rely more on other horizontal actors to achieve their objectives. This
is particularly the case in those sectors that require a coordinated response from
various stakeholders and/or speciﬁc expertise that may not exist within a single
organisation.
Conclusions
This article has expanded on Rhodes’ (1981) theory of power dependence in central–local
government relations to set out a more comprehensive and dynamic framework for ana-
lysing policy-making at the subnational level. In particular, it has combined Rhodes’
concept with Stone’s (1989) notion of ‘urban regimes’ to develop a dynamic and bi-direc-
tional framework for analysing local governance. By applying Rhodes’ principle of power
dependence along both the vertical and horizontal dimensions, this tool can provide a
more holistic understanding of subnational policy-making arrangements than existing
multi-level governance and urban studies perspectives.
The framework also stresses the important role that vertical resource dependencies play
in determining how a subnational government operates within its jurisdiction. It suggests
that if a subnational body is able to access sufﬁcient resources from higher tiers of
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government to achieve its policy objectives, it will be better placed to adopt a hierarchical
and independent position in local governance arrangements. However, if this necessary
support is not forthcoming along the vertical dimension, it will need to work more inter-
dependently with (or even depend on) other horizontal actors to increase its capacity. This
would mean that it loses some inﬂuence over decision-making. In this way, a subnational
government’s level of capacity, and the extent to which it receives support from higher
tiers of government, can shape its relationships with other local actors – and ultimately
inﬂuence policy outputs.
Initially, this framework was developed to support an empirical study that compared
local policy-making arrangements in two countries that have contrasting intergovernmen-
tal structures. However, it has wider applicability in other contexts, and further studies
may wish to test the hypotheses set out in Figure 3. The framework also raises a
number of normative concerns about the nature of local democracy and the extent to
which subnational governments are becoming depoliticised – issues that scholars in the
ﬁeld of applied political theory may wish to consider. Finally, politicians and ofﬁcials
within subnational bodies may wish to ponder the likely implications of greater autonomy
(or ‘localism’) from higher tiers of government. In particular, the perceived Holy Grail of
greater vertical independence might prove to be a poisoned chalice if it reduces municipa-
lities’ capacity to achieve policy objectives and therefore makes them more dependent on
other horizontal actors in governance arrangements. Such a scenario could actually reduce
the ability of subnational bodies to shape policy-making within their jurisdictions.
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